This uniquely fascinating volume is not merely a learned treatise in historical semantics; it is itself a stupendous display of world harmony as a creed-a vivid demonstration that "all is all.".

The appeal of the moral principle according to which we should treat like cases alike is so great that it verges on the axiomatic, or on the platitudinous. Recently, however, the principle has been challenged in deeply interesting ways. These ways are interesting because they do not invite skepticism about morality at large, but about the specific claim that what is good (or bad) for an agent in a given situation must be good (or bad) for any other similarly situated (...) agent. I here assess the post-challenge viability of the principle. In a sense, the principle survives, but this is neither an unqualified victory nor an inspiring result. The examination of these matters contains an important (and under-investigated) lesson about the nature of moral experience. (shrink)

Victor Tadros’ The Ends of Harm is the most recent systematic attempt to defend the good old utilitarian justification of punishment. The attempt fails for a variety of reasons, which are here explored. First, the attempt presupposes an implausible account of human’s psychology. Second, the attempt confuses an attack on retributivism with an attack on certain criminal justice systems. Finally, Tadros admits that his justification of punishment is best seen as a mere step along the road to full-blown abolitionism – (...) and so he unwittingly admits the extraordinarily thin sense in which he could be said to be really attempting to justify punishment. (shrink)

The Adoption Problem (AP) was a postponed issue for some years (Kripke, 2024; Padró, 2015; Birman, 2024). This problem highlights certain difficulties surrounding the adoption of rules of inference: If anti-exceptionalism is wrong, is it possible to adopt an alternative logic? What is the point of the revision of logic in epistemology? During 2022 Kripke, Padró and Barrio held seminars on AP. The latter two edited the first thematic section on this subject in the journal Análisis Filosófico. It contains “What (...) the Adoption Problem Does Not Show” by Camilo Fiore, subject of this critical note, in which Fiore holds two theses: 1) AP is compatible with the thesis that logica utens is revisable; 2) to assess whether an agent can revise their logic, it is best to consider a different definition of adoption, e.g. weak adoption, according to which Universal Instantiation and Modus Ponens are sometimes adoptable. It then states that (1) and (2) are independent. In this article I will criticize the independence between (1) and (2). To this end, I will point out that thesis (1) and (2) are supported by the examples of Carrie and Barry, respectively, and that the type of logical revision involved in both is the same and local. Therefore, (1) and (2) are not independent. Next, I argue that it is impossible to satisfy another kind of logical revision, e.g. global revision. Therefore, the interdependence between (1) and (2) is not due to the examples proposed. (shrink)

Derek Parfit has recently defended the view that no one can ever deserve to suffer. Were this view correct, its implications for the thorny problem of the justification of punishment would be extraordinary: age-old debates between consequentialists and retributivists would simply vanish, as punishment would only—and simply—be justifiable along Benthamite utilitarian lines. I here suggest that Parfit’s view is linked to uncharacteristically weak arguments, and that it ought to be rejected.

David Boonin, The Problem of Punishment. There are two reasons why David Boonin's recent book, The Problem of Punishment,1 offers me a unique oppor...

While it is no doubt a good pedagogical principle to stress the most convincing proof in the first learning of a philosophic thesis, yet a man with any pretence to philosophic effeciency should certainly have at his beck and call several proofs to do service in various situations. Mr. Brown indicates a few subsidiary proofs in connection with the subject of materialsm, a consideration of grave import in the philosophical world today.

In this article, I examine some traditional Indian conceptions of unconscious mental activity. There are concepts in the Indian philosophical tradition, notably saskāras and vāsanās, which can be taken to refer to unconscious mental states and dispositions. My discussion, which is essentially philosophical by nature, is loosely based on the English philosopher C.D. Broad's distinctions concerning the unconscious. Saskāras, which are interpreted realistically in Indian tradition, may manifest themselves as what I (and Broad) call relatively unconscious states. Evidence for this (...) interpretation can be found in discussions concerning the nature of dream state and the supernatural powers of yogis in Indian tradition. It is interesting to try to view the retributive system of karma as an absolutely unconscious system, but this is not a plausible interpretation of the Indian view of karma. (shrink)